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Commentary on Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the
Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963"

John S. Duffield*

Introduction

Thanks to a wealth of new documents made possible by the end
of the Cold War, many historians are reconsidering the origins,
evolution, consequences, and meaning of that historic conflict.1
Deserving particular attention in this process of reassessment is
I wish to thank to Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs for
providing me with copies of several of the documents cited in
their article that are located in the Karber Collection.
*

the East-West political-military confrontation in the heart of
Europe, which did so much to define the Cold War.
confrontation come about?

How did that

Could it have been avoided, or at

least mitigated in intensity, and possibly brought to a peaceful
conclusion at an earlier date?
policy in the region?

How appropriate was Western

The search for ever better-informed

answers to such questions must rank high among scholarly
priorities.
Consequently, the article by Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs
represents a potentially valuable contribution to current
historical debates.

Its primary goal is to shed new light on

Western intelligence estimates of the Soviet military threat to
Western Europe during the early Cold War.

In particular, the

article seeks to appraise the validity of those assessments, and
thus the appropriateness of the Western military plans that
flowed from them, in view of what we now know about actual Soviet
conventional capabilities at the time.

A second and derivative

objective is to evaluate the existing scholarship on Western
threat assessments.

How accurately have historians and others

portrayed them?
This commentary assesses the article in terms of both of
these goals.

What do Karber and Combs add to our existing

knowledge of Western threat assessments?

And do they cause us to

call into question the judgments of previous scholarship?
order to keep my comments to a reasonable length, I will

In

concentrate on those parts of the article that concern the 1950s
and, to a lesser extent, the early 1960s.

My principal rationale

for this choice of focus is that, prior to the outbreak of the
Korean War in mid-1950, the impact of Western estimates of Soviet
capabilities on Western planning was attenuated by relatively
benign assessments of Soviet intentions.

In addition, I am less

familiar with the details of Western threat assessments conducted
before the establishment of NATO in 1949.
I find that Karber and Combs add somewhat to our
understanding of Western military estimates and confirm a number
of previous findings.

They do not, however, present as much new

information as they suggest, and their critique of the existing
literature is largely unfounded.

This commentary concludes with

a brief discussion of some of the important questions that remain
for historians to answer.2

New Information?

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of the article lies
in its evaluation of the accuracy of Western assessments.

To

this end, Karber and Combs have juxtaposed much of the
information that is now available on actual Soviet military
capabilities during the period in question with Western estimates
of those capabilities at the time.

In this way, they are able to

show (pp. 15-16)3 that Western military analysts first

overestimated and then underestimated overall Soviet
capabilities.

In the late 1940s, the Soviet army may have

contained as few as 1.8 million men, although Western
intelligence put the total at 2.5 million.

In the 1950s, in

contrast, Western analysts continued to peg the size of the Red
Army at 2.5 million even as the actual figure climbed to as high
as 3.6 million.

At the same time, Karber and Combs argue (p. 4)

that those analysts were nevertheless able to construct accurate
estimates of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, which
constituted a subset of overall Soviet capabilities.
A second noteworthy aspect of the article is the
considerable detail that it provides on the methods by which
Western analysts arrived at these estimates.

Particularly

interesting is the description of how analysts used the Field
Post Numbers of Soviet units to determine their existence,
location, and activities (pp. 7-8, esp. note 22).

Of related

interest are the discussions of why Western analysts adhered to
the estimate of 2.5 million men in Soviet army despite the
receipt of information suggesting that this figure was either too
low (p. 21) or too high (pp. 33-34).
Third, Karber and Combs perform a useful scholarly service
by presenting additional evidence that confirms previous
scholarly characterizations of U.S. estimates of Soviet military
capabilities in the 1950s, including the size of the active
Soviet army (2.5 million men), the number of Soviet divisions,

both active (175) and reserve (140), and their manning levels in
peacetime (60-80 percent).4

Nevertheless, although their

comparison of what analysts then thought and what we now know is
original, much of the detail that Karber and Combs provide about
the content of Western estimates in the 1950s and early 1960s is
not.

Likewise, they offer little information on NATO strategy,

force requirements, and actual military capabilities that has not
been described elsewhere, often on the basis of the same primary
sources that they cite.5
Not only do Karber and Combs offer no fundamental challenge
to the picture that other scholars have drawn of Western
estimates and NATO planning, moreover, but they oversimplify the
documentary record by overlooking important evidence and critical
distinctions.

To be sure, space constraints typically preclude

the inclusion of all possibly relevant data.

But it is striking

that Karber and Combs dwell much more on the indicators of Soviet
strength that appear in the assessments than they do on the
available evidence of Soviet weaknesses.

Similarly, wherever a

range of estimates is to be found in the archives, they have
tended to note only the highest of those available.

Any of the

qualifications of Soviet capabilities contained in the documents
that they do present are typically confined to the notes.

This

consistent pattern of selective reporting raises questions about
the accuracy of their portrayal of Western estimates.

With regard to overall Soviet capabilities, for example,
Karber and Combs argue (pp. 13-14) that the Soviet Union had
enough tanks to equip all 175 active divisions, and possibly 140
or so reserve divisions as well.

In so doing, they play down the

fact that many Soviet divisions had little organic armor (note
47) and that, on average, Soviet divisions contained perhaps as
few as 100 armored fighting vehicles each.6
With regard to Soviet mobilization schedules, Karber and
Combs mention (pp. 10-11 and 14) only those estimates stating
that the active army divisions could be ready by M+5 and the
reserve divisions by M+30.

They fail to note the longer

estimates, of up to M+30 and M+180, respectively, that can be
found in the archives.7

In fact, at least one of the documents

that they cite (JCS 2073/7) clearly describes the M+5/M+30
estimates as "maximum" Soviet ground force mobilization
capabilities.
With regard to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, Karber and
Combs mention numbers of divisions and the increase in manning
levels that took place in Germany in the late 1940s and early
1950s (pp. 19-20).

They do not acknowledge, however, the

relatively small size of the Soviet division slice, even when
fully manned, in comparison with its NATO counterparts or the
expectation of at least some U.S. analysts that the Soviet Union
would need to maintain substantial forces in the satellite
countries.8

In addition, they fail to differentiate (pp. 21-23)

between those satellite divisions likely to participate in an
attack on the Central Region, which is the geographical focus of
their study, and those located in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania
that would have been employed elsewhere.
Perhaps most problematic of all are the figures that Karber
and Combs offer (pp. 20 and 24-25) for the estimated size (100 or
more divisions) of a reinforced Soviet attack against Western
Europe, which was a critical Western planning factor.

Once

again, they fail to distinguish between the magnitude of the
total threat to the region and the smaller number of divisions
that would likely have been brought to bear on the central
front.9

And they again cite only the highest available figures

for Western estimates, overlooking the range of estimates that
actually appear in U.S. documents.10

Finally, the provenance of

some of the numbers in the tables for Soviet divisions is
unclear, since they do not appear in the given citations.

New Analysis?

In the process of describing Western intelligence estimates,
Karber and Combs seek to set their work apart from the existing
literature on the subject, their assessment of which is highly
critical.

Most importantly, they take previous studies to task

for wrongly charging that Western analysts intentionally
exaggerated Soviet military capabilities (pp. 2, 23, and 38).

They argue, in contrast, that U.S. and NATO intelligence
estimates of the threat to Western Europe were generally accurate
and that, in any case, no deliberate overestimation took place
(p. 4).
There are at least two problems with these claims.

First,

the principal historical work with which they take issue, a 1982
article by Matthew Evangelista, focuses explicitly on the late
1940s, a period during which Karber and Combs agree (pp, 15-16
and 38) that Western estimates probably overstated Soviet
strength.11

Evangelista's suggestion that many in the West may

have intentionally exaggerated the threat during that period is
not a central part of his argument, being confined to two pages
at the end of the article.

In any case, this suggestion does not

seem unreasonable in view of the extensive evidence concerning
actual Soviet capabilities that he presents, evidence that Karber
and Combs do not refute.
Second, and more fundamentally, Karber and Combs blur an
important set of distinctions.

In order to understand this

failing, it is necessary to recognize that three separate
questions are at issue.

The first concerns what Soviet military

capabilities actually were.

The second concerns what Western

analysts thought they were.

The third concerns what Western

political leaders said they were.
Karber and Combs deal primarily with the accuracy of Western
estimates; that is, the correspondence between actual Soviet

capabilities and Western intelligence estimates of them.

In

contrast, the work of mine that they cite addresses the
correspondence between Western military estimates and public
characterizations of the threat by Western leaders.12

In fact,

that article pointedly argues that Western assessments in the
1950s were far more nuanced than was suggested by public
pronouncements, which typically portrayed the threat in
unqualified terms.

It nowhere claims that the intelligence

estimates themselves were exaggerated.
Thus, given the multiplicity of issues involved, there is
not necessarily a conflict between their position and the premise
of my article.

To the contrary, it is possible -- indeed, the

record suggests -- both that military analysts offered honest, if
not always accurate, estimates of Soviet capabilities and that
Western political leaders often portrayed the threat in
exaggerated terms.

Karber and Combs either miss or gloss over

this fundamental point.

Unanswered Questions

In closing, it is worth noting some of the important
questions raised by Karber and Combs that remain unanswered and
that might serve as a useful focus for future scholarly inquiry.
Their article is not the last word on the subject of Soviet

military capabilities and the validity of Western threat
assessments, something that they explicitly acknowledge (p. 3).
One multifaceted question is who knew what and when?

Karber

and Combs frequently imply that estimates from the mid- and late
1940s informed Western planning in the early 1950s.
Nevertheless, we still do not know with any certainty whether and
to what degree Western analysts continued to base their
assessments on information that was acquired before the formation
of NATO.

Perhaps we have simply not yet found the relevant

contemporary documents in which this intelligence was updated.

A

related matter concerns the familiarity of political leaders with
the details of military estimates when they spoke publicly about
the threat.

Which documents had they seen?

What was the content

of the briefings that they had received?
A second set of issues regards the assessment process
itself, especially within the United States.

What role did each

of the various extant intelligence units play in the process?
What information did they share with one another?

Much of the

information that Karber and Combs present come from documents
prepared within the U.S. Army.

Can we be sure that this

information was always made available to and considered at higher
levels?

Related to this are uncertainties about the reasons for

the persistence in U.S. estimates of overall Soviet capabilities
despite the receipt of potentially inconsistent information.
Although Karber and Combs offer some plausible explanations (pp.

17, 21, and 33-34), their discussion is highly speculative,
suggesting the need for further research.
A further set of unanswered questions concerns the details
of NATO military planning.

On which threat assessments were the

alliance's defense plans actually based?

In particular, can we

safely assume that NATO planners had access to and were free to
use all of the information to be found in classified U.S.
documents?

And given a particular estimate of Soviet

capabilities, how did NATO planners determine alliance force
requirements?

Again, Karber and Combs offer some interesting

speculation on the subject (pp. 28-29) but few hard facts.
Finally, what were the details of NATO war plans at various
times?
Of course, answering questions of this nature is not likely
to be easy.

Inquiry into these topics is likely to be burdened

by the traditionally cautious attitude of the intelligence
community toward the revelation of sources and methods, no matter
how dated they may be.

At the same time, a better understanding

of NATO planning will probably require access to the internal
records of the alliance, which may be extremely difficult to come
by, even assuming that relevant documents exist.

Consequently,

these are areas in which the organized efforts of historians to
achieve the opening of early Cold War archival materials may be
highly worthwhile.
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